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With 282,00 members in 1945, 683,000 in 1985, and 375,000 members in 1994, trade unions have 
been the single most significant mass institution in New Zealand society throughout the post-war era.  
They remain, therefore, the best organisations in a position to give voice to workers' industrial and 
political concerns at workplace and national levels.  This chapter considers the continued relevance of 
trade unions and their strengths and limitations, both theoretically and in practice.  The chapter starts 
with a theoretical discussion of the role of unions as organising institutions and of union officials as 
bargaining agents who are both part of the labour movement but also separate from the working class.  
The second section turns to the practice of New Zealand unionism since 1945. Particular attention is 
paid to the political strategies pursued by employers and union officials, culminating in an analysis of 
the industrial and political paralysis which has gripped the leadership of the Council of Trade Unions 
(CTU) since its foundation in 1987. 
 
The Politics of Unionism 
 
Why Trade Unions? 
 
Broadly, there are three major interpretations of the role of unions — the unitarist, the pluralist and the 
radical or Marxist.  The unitarist perspective, which has become increasingly prevalent since the 
enactment of the Employment Contracts Act, suggests that the interests of employers and employees 
are one and the same and that unions, as ‘third parties’, interfere in the natural order of business life.  
Both workers and bosses benefit from thriving businesses, the former with job security and higher 
wages, the latter with profits and the ability to invest in further growth (Brook, 1990).  
 To the extent that unions gain a foothold, blame can be attached to one of two culprits — poor 
managers or agitators.  By communicating badly, managers can unwittingly give employees the wrong 
message and ‘upsets’ may result.  This is all the more likely if malevolent individuals, the ‘agitators’, 
are at work.  Such agitators use a combination of misinformation, deceit, hard work and charisma to 
sour relations between employees and employers, thereby creating the conditions for union growth. 
 Unitarists see the ‘labour market’ as constituting mutually beneficial exchanges between 
employers and employees in which both exercise ‘freedom of choice’.  Workers should be free to 
decide how and under what conditions to sell their labour power and whether or not to join unions or 
to engage the services of unions as their bargaining agents.  Relations between workers and 
employers, as freely-trading individuals, should be governed not by statute law but by the law of 
contract, a case most influentially put by Epstein (1984).  The resulting ‘freedom of contract’ 
therefore enables employers and employees to deal with each other as equals in the pursuit of their 
common goals.  Such was the blueprint for industrial relations set down by the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable (1987) and New Zealand Employers Federation (1987). 
 While some writers from this tradition pretend to care for the interests of employees and even 
on occasion unions themselves (suggesting that their only concern is to improve the effectiveness of 
unions), the kernel of the unitarist view is strongly anti-union.  The unitarist view is that unions and 
conflict are essentially illegitimate, dysfunctional or the sign of an underlying pathology in what is 
essentially a harmonious relationship between employer and employees. 
 The unitarist view has been the subject of strong criticism over the decades.  Although the 
labour contract has the appearance of being freely entered into by two independent actors, worker and 
employer, there is an acute imbalance in power between the two parties which is either not recognised, 
or is consciously hidden, by the unitarist approach.  There are a variety of manifestations of this 
imbalance, which have their origins in the employment relationship itself as well as in the state, the 
judiciary, the media, and control over prevailing ideologies.  The key factor is that for the worker, the 
freedom of the labour market is the freedom to work or live in poverty.  The worker cannot for any 
length of time hoard her labour power waiting for the price to rise or for their bargaining opponent to 
give way.  Employers, by contrast, usually have reserves of capital to fall back on.  The worker cannot 
usually afford to call upon the services of legal advisers to advise her on how best to gain leverage in 
bargaining.  And in the case of disputes with her opponent, the worker cannot usually rely on 
assistance from the courts or agents of law enforcement who respect first and foremost rights 
pertaining to property, not the right to a job and a decent livelihood.  If the last should be in doubt, 
2 
simply consider the last occasion on which police were used to assist picketers during a strike, rather 
than hinder them. 
 The second major approach to unionism is pluralist or institutionalist.  This starts from the 
premise that society is divided into a series of interest groups which are in a constant state of tense co-
operation.  Tension, because interest groups are formed by individuals with their own needs coming 
together to advance their interests on a collective basis in opposition to other social groupings.  Co-
operation, because ultimately society has to function collectively, and interest groups, while fighting 
to improve their own situation within the greater polity, must acquiesce to the greater needs of unity 
against external threat or internal implosion.  
 In the field of industrial relations, pluralists view conflict as being endemic within the system, 
as wage earners, through their trade unions, try to increase wages, reduce hours or otherwise improve 
their lot in the face of opposition from employers who have a vested interest in enhancing profits and 
managerial prerogatives.  Battles over ‘shares of the pie’ result.  Pluralists therefore regard trade 
unions as legitimate, and industrial conflict merely the expression of competition between parties of 
roughly equal strength.  However, they emphasise, conflict should not be taken ‘too far’, for otherwise 
‘the economy’ will suffer.  Pluralists therefore urge the state to step in to establish a framework 
whereby union affairs and industrial conflict can be managed.  Thus the key task for the pluralist 
approach is how best to manage conflict through mechanisms such as collective bargaining, 
conciliation and arbitration, works councils, wages boards and the like.  This is where the connection 
between pluralism as a political philosophy and social democracy as a governmental practice is most 
apparent. 
 The problem with the pluralist analysis is its insistence that the various parties have roughly 
equivalent power, a notion that cannot be sustained in practice.  Some of the same criticisms of the 
unitarist analysis also apply to the pluralist: while workers are undoubtedly stronger when banded 
together in unions, they still face capital from a position of weakness because, like the individual 
worker, they have little control over the major economic decisions taken by business and the 
government.  By encouraging unions to be ‘restrained’ in their demands, the pluralists overlook this 
basic difference in power.  Furthermore, the more uncertain the economic environment, the more the 
pluralist analysis comes to resemble the unitarist because at its core, the pluralist approach also 
accepts that the interests of labour and capital are the same.  In conditions of business hardship, the 
space for workers to put their own demands on business is reduced drastically by an insistence by both 
unitarists and pluralists that unions be ‘reasonable’.  
 The final interpretation, and the one which will be adopted in this chapter, is the radical or 
Marxist, which denies that society is organised on the basis either of the invisible hand or of a plethora 
of roughly equally balanced ‘interest groups’.  Rather, it starts from the premise that there are two 
major classes in capitalist society – the capitalist and working classes. The former constitutes a ruling 
class on the basis of its effective control of the major forms of production, that the two classes have 
mutually antagonistic interests, and that the tension between the classes is not of a type that can 
forever be contained by institutional forms. 
 Within this broad arena, trade unions come into being to partially redress the power imbalance 
recognised by the pluralists.  However, rather than seeing unions as simply being one of several 
‘interest groups’, Marxists set the workplace into its broader socio-political context and argue that 
unions are basic combat institutions of a class and provide a means whereby workers begin to organise 
and act independently as a class to combat capitalist exploitation.  While pluralists are concerned with 
channelling conflict into safe procedures, and warn against a tendency by unions to go ‘too far’, 
Marxists celebrate workers' struggle against employers, but at the same time lament that union 
struggle on its own does not go far enough.  Marxists argue that unions are by their very nature 
profoundly contradictory institutions, being part of capitalism but also containing within themselves 
the potential for its supersession.  Unions negotiate the terms on which labour power is exploited, 
rather than seeking to end exploitation.  They organise workers by trade, occupation, industry or 
region, not on a class-wide basis.  Trade union consciousness is therefore limited usually to advancing 
the interests of particular sections of the class, and trade union action never spontaneously leads to 
revolutionary challenges to the capitalist order as a whole.  
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The Role of Union Officials  
 
The fact that unions are essentially self-limiting capitalist institutions has a profound effect on the 
behaviour of trade union officials.  Collective agreements or awards are a form of ‘industrial legality’ 
and represent a gain for the working class because they reduce the arbitrariness of capital (Gramsci, 
1920, p. 93) but, by the same token, the legality and formalisation of collective bargaining can be used 
by trade union officials as a platform from which to promote their own interests counterposed to those 
of the rank and file membership. 
 The American union movement affords the clearest case of the alienation of union officials 
from the members that they represent.  Mills described the American labour leader as ‘a business 
entrepreneur in the important and specialised business of contracting a supply of trained labour’ 
(1948, p. 6).  While New Zealand unions have never been so marked by corruption as their American 
counterparts, the difference is only one of degree.  Amongst all senior union officials in New Zealand 
there is a tendency to defend their unions in ways that emphasise their own expertise rather than mass 
mobilisation.  They seek to insulate themselves from pressure from below, fearful of losing their jobs 
which entitle them to a privileged existence in terms of income, working conditions, social prestige 
and opportunities for social advance, when compared to the membership at large.  Most importantly, 
conservative industrial tactics are encouraged by employers and governments who promote 
moderation in union aims and methods.  System-breaking demands are replaced by those that can be 
met without jeopardising union-employer relations.  As a result, union officials become firm 
defenders of the established system of bargaining, and compromise comes to be seen as a desirable 
end in itself.  The union official therefore becomes, in Mills' famous phrase, ‘the manager of 
discontent’ (Mills, 1948, pp. 8–9). 
 This approach to trade union officials (what has been called the ‘rank and filist perspective’) 
can be defended against three common criticisms.  One objection is that it oversimplifies internal 
processes and that in practice there is no such thing as a united rank and file union membership with 
common interests counterposed to those of full-time officials.  Divisions between members may be 
just as significant as those between members and their full-time representatives.  However, while it is 
true that the membership of most unions is fractured along a number of lines, the logic of even the 
most basic industrial action is to promote unity in practice.  There are innumerable historical examples 
that indicate this phenomenon.  For example, those unions which established barriers to entry on the 
basis of sex or race in their early days now appear to have abolished these obstacles.  There are no 
longer any separate tailoresses' and tailors' unions, for example.  The trend is also indicated in the 
struggles of workers of both sexes and from a host of different national and racial backgrounds.  For 
example, the industrial campaigns in the meatworks in the 1960s and 1970s threw together Pakeha, 
Maori and Pacific Islanders.  Such is the multi-national and multi-racial nature of most contemporary 
working classes that all modern strikes, if they are to be successful, require workers to set aside their 
prejudices and to work together in order to forge a common fighting organisation.  In the course of 
industrial campaigns a collective consciousness emerges which gives meaning to the idea that the 
‘rank and file’ is not a term devoid of analytical use. 
 A second criticism of the rank and filist perspective is that union officials are prevented from 
becoming a conservative and unrepresentative stratum because they must respond to membership 
sentiment.  If they do not respond to such sentiment, they stand the chance of being turned out of 
office and replaced by those who are more in tune with membership wishes.  It is certainly true that 
there are limits to the conservatism of trade union officials, based on their need to respond to 
membership pressure.  Precisely because trade unions themselves are contradictory institutions, trade 
union officials ‘perform a dual role, both shackling their members to the system and bringing home 
limited benefits within it’ (Anderson, 1967, p. 277).  Faced with pressure from below, they may seek 
to repress the threat in order to preserve the status quo in form and substance or they may attempt to 
accommodate to it, to change the form of relations within the union and between the union and 
employers, in order to preserve the substance of leadership dominance.  This may involve taking a 
more militant stance towards management and adopting measures designed to co-opt those within the 
union promoting a more aggressive industrial strategy. 
 However, the fact that full-time officials are forced to respond to pressure from below does 
not remove the pressure from capital and state.  Caught between these powerful social forces, the full-
time official tends to vacillate, for as Hyman  argues, ‘his task is to sustain a delicate balance between 
grievance and satisfaction, between activism and quiescence’ (1971, p. 37).  Officials play an 
inherently conservative role for the reasons already outlined, but such conservatism is mediated by the 
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relative pressure from bargaining partners and rank and file members.  Their conservatism is therefore 
contingent and historically determined. 
 The final criticism of the rank and filist perspective appears the most damaging.  There is no 
evidence from surveys that full-time officials incline to conservatism and an emphasis on 
proceduralism at the expense of industrial action or that rank and file members can be regarded as 
more militant or more prepared to endorse bold industrial action than their leaders (Kelly (1988, p. 
178).  But this is to misinterpret the criticism.  The argument, is not that officials are always 
conservative, rank and file members always militant.  Rather, it is suggested that the conditions of 
existence of both groups do have a strong impact on their consciousness and thereby on their activity, 
such that in periods of sharp conflict, the actions of workers and those of full-time officials can 
diverge quite dramatically from their attitudes as revealed in surveys.  Thus there is the phenomenon 
of union members voting for the National Party being more prepared to engage in militant industrial 
action than Labour or Alliance union officials. 
 In order to understand why this can occur, it is important to consider the volatile nature of 
working class consciousness and the factors that shape it.  Gramsci has provided the most useful 
theoretical approach for understanding the complex nature of working class consciousness.  He argues 
that the worker's 
 
theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity.  
One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one 
contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in 
reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the 
real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the 
past and uncritically absorbed (Gramsci, 1971, p. 333). 
 
To paraphrase: the more abstract and distant the issue under consideration, the more that workers' 
attitudes, as revealed in surveys, are influenced by the ‘common-sense’ ideas of society at large.  The 
explicit consciousness of most workers may therefore be quite conservative, for such ‘common-sense’ 
ideas are invariably supportive of existing social relations.  By contrast, the more that the issue is 
concrete and personal, and the more that it bears upon their immediate relations with their fellow 
workers, the more likely are workers to respond to opinion pollsters on the basis of their own life and 
work experience.  The answers that workers give in such circumstances are more indicative of their 
implicit consciousness, and often stand quite at odds with accepted social mores.  
 Many unionised workers with experience of industrial action share a common frame of 
reference whose elements form a basic class consciousness.  These include: the need for workers to 
stick together, an antipathy to the boss and those who would break strikes, a suspicion of the role of 
police on picket lines, and an understanding that workers can only protect what they have (or improve 
on it) by being prepared to fight.  Such notions are especially likely to come to the fore in periods of 
collective industrial action, when workers are engaged in what Gramsci called ‘the practical 
transformation of the real world’ (1971, p. 333).  It is only by recognising the contradictory elements 
of working-class consciousness that can explain why trade unionists questioned in surveys say that 
they think unions in general are too powerful or too ready to strike, but do not feel the same about 
their own union. 
 Industrial action by trade unionists has a powerful effect in stimulating workers' 
consciousness of the identity and power of their class.  The struggle of rank and file union members 
has a tendency to break from the legal channels sanctioned by full-time officials, not least because 
members have no material attachment to the formal procedures of industrial relations.  Thus, once 
mobilised and once conscious of the issues at stake, rank and file union members can be rapidly 
driven into industrial action extending well beyond what their full-time officials are willing to 
sanction.  Sharp swings of membership sentiment can occur with great rapidity, from docility and 
acquiescence to aggression and confidence and back again, and it is in the fluidity of members' ideas 
that they stand in contrast to full-time officials. 
 The consciousness of full-time union officials is not subject to the same major fluctuations.  In 
contrast to rank and file workers, such officials, even those with a dedicated commitment to advancing 
working-class interests, have no collective interest in breaking established union-management 
relations for it is on these that they depend for their very existence.  The power of full-time officials 
rests in the last instance on their specialised role as negotiators over the terms on which labour is 
exploited.  In the event of a strike full-time officials are forced to consider what effect this action has 
on the distribution of power within their union.  Does it threaten the bargaining relationship with the 
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employers and the officials' role in it, or does it strengthen it?  This factor helps explain their industrial 
timidity at critical moments.  In this sense, the differing positions of rank and file members and full-
time union officials with respect to capital and state lend the former an intrinsic tendency to shatter 
industrial routinism and the latter a tendency to reinforce it.  
 
Trade Unions: the New Zealand Experience 
 
Thus far the argument has been couched at a relatively abstract level.  What follows uses the Marxist 
framework developed to this point to shed light on developments in New Zealand unionism since 
1945. 
 
The Domination of Labourism and Arbitration, 1945-1966 
 
In order to understand the specific nature of New Zealand trade unionism as it stood in 1945 and how 
it evolved over the following decades, it is critical to situate it in the context of its relationship with 
the state and the Labour Party.  The political agenda of the Labour Party has always been reformism, 
not revolution.  Reformist politics can be understood as a theory and practice which ‘create defensive 
barriers against the naked exploitation of capitalism but at the same time accept the possibility of 
social change within the existing framework of capitalist society rather than seeking through 
revolutionary means to overthrow it’ (Darlington, 1994, p. 14). 
 The formation and electoral success of the Labour Party in the early part of the century 
consolidated a particular form of capitalist class rule in New Zealand based on the incorporation of 
trade union officials into the political process, rather than their exclusion.  This has discouraged 
radical demands and actions that might jeopardise Labour's electoral chances.  The closeness of 
connections between the Labour Party and leading trade unions officials was evident with the 
formation of the FOL in 1937 as a result of pressure from the Savage government.  Labour in turn 
amended its rules giving the unions large block votes in party conferences.  This in turn allowed the 
party leaders more control over fractious conferences because it concentrated decision-making in a 
few hands.  In the period during and immediately after the Second World War, Federation leaders 
were involved to an unprecedented degree in Government affairs, culminating in their involvement in 
the tripartite Economic Stabilisation Commission and the appointment of the Federation's president to 
the position of Minister of National Service, later Minister of Labour.  In return, the higher levels of 
the union bureaucracy gave unstinting support to wage control and work intensification arising out of 
the war effort.  As Olssen  comments, ‘the Federation thus became a means of disciplining the labour 
force on the government's behalf’ (1986a, p. 24). 
 Even after the fall of the Labour Government in 1949 and the advent of more than two 
decades of almost uninterrupted conservative rule, the state interventionist agenda made a place for 
the union officialdom.  State mechanisms were established to minimise explicit class antagonisms and 
these were in turn underpinned by full employment and economic growth (Wilkes, 1993, p. 200).  
Critical to the role of the union officialdom was the arbitration system which affected the internal 
politics of New Zealand trade unions in a variety of ways.  According to Walsh 
 
This system offered a glittering array of benefits to participating unions: for 
registered unions the state guaranteed their coverage rights against potential rivals, 
obliged employers to negotiate with them, gave easy access to compulsory 
arbitration by state tribunals, ensured the application of resulting awards to all 
workers in the occupation or industry concerned and accepted a responsibility to 
enforce the award upon all employers.  From 1936 the state also guaranteed 
membership and thus revenues for registered unions  (1991, p. 1; see also Chapter 
11). 
 
Membership in the private sector grew strongly under state protection and by 1945, there were 
282,000 members of registered and state sector unions, representing 59.6 per cent of the workforce.  
Table 1 indicates that growth continued at a steady pace throughout the two post-war decades as 
membership increased to just under 450,000 members. 
 
Insert Table 7.1 about here 
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 State protection did not come without strings, however, and unions were required to accept an 
extensive range of statutory restrictions upon their structure and activities.  The outcome was that 
unions were for the most part ‘arbitrationist in character, created by the system and dependent for their 
existence upon the protections it offered’ (Walsh, 1991a, p. 1).  Such unions tended to be small, 
covered poorly-organised workers and had precious little in the way of workplace representation.  
State-sponsored compulsory unionism led to union officials becoming lazy for, as Peetz and others 
comment, ‘unions had been able to demand fees from a captive membership and had thus been under 
no obligation to perform’ (1993, p. 266).  Employers, as well as conservative union leaders, were keen 
supporters of compulsory unionism, because it gave a power base to conservative leaders of 
industrially passive unions.  It also allowed governments to break more militant unions by 
deregistering them and establishing tame unions in their place (Roth, 1973, p. 80).  
 There were also, however, a minority of unions, chiefly industrial unions in the export-
industry sectors (waterside workers, seafarers, miners, freezing workers) and also drivers, who were 
opposed to the wage-fixing elements of the Arbitration Court and made advances in wages and 
conditions through industrial action.  While the arbitrationist unions looked to the protection afforded 
by the arbitration system, the mobilisational unions preferred to rely on their strategic location, high 
levels of membership solidarity and commitment, and effective leadership (Brosnan et al., 1990, p. 
99).  Such unions had a better developed workplace structure of delegates and stewards and 
consistently chafed against the industrially passive politics of the arbitrationist unions.  
 For a large part of this century, therefore, New Zealand unions have been divided in their 
approach and general philosophy, and these tensions came to a head in two historical periods: with the 
rise of the Red Federation of Labour in the years before the First World War (Olssen, 1986b), and in 
the post-war industrial upsurge which culminated in the formation of the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) and the 1951 waterfront lockout (Barnes, 1987, Roth, 1986).  On both occasions the pro-
arbitration union leaders sided with the conservative government and employers to crush the threat 
posed by the anti-arbitrationist unions, in the process killing off the Red Feds in 1913 and the TUC in 
1951.  As a result of their victory in 1951, the leaders of the arbitrationist unions were able to 
consolidate their domination in the FOL and used this control to rewrite the Federation's constitution, 
thereby making the Executive more remote from rank and file control (Roth, 1973, pp. 137-8).  This 
in turn led to a fifteen year period of industrial quiescence within the New Zealand labour movement 
(see Table 1).  Although, as may be seen from Table 1, union membership grew significantly in this 
period, actual coverage (‘union density’) fell from nearly 60 per cent of the workforce in 1945 to just 
over 50 per cent twenty years later. 
 
The Working-Class Upturn, 1966-1977 
 
In line with many other western countries, the New Zealand labour movement began to stir again in 
the mid- to late 1960s (see Table 1).  The major factor responsible for this was a desire by New 
Zealand workers to improve their living standards in circumstances of labour shortages, alongside a 
long-term decline in the wages share of national income (Roper, 1990b).  Increasing union pressure 
was demonstrated by the rise of over-award payments from 8 per cent of award rates in 1947 to 30 per 
cent in 1965 (Roth, 1978, p. 47).  Then in 1968, when the Arbitration Court made a nil general wage 
order (the benchmark against which all increases in award wages were determined), this led to a 
collapse in union confidence in the Court and a decision by the leaders of all major unions to engage 
in direct action to win pay rises through collective bargaining.  According to Brosnan et al. (1990), the 
mobilisational model of unionism advocated by traditionally militant unions now came to the fore, 
most obviously amongst public-sector workers, such as public servants, nurses, postal workers, and 
teachers.  The overall effect was an explosion in strike activity from just under 22,000 working days 
lost in 1965 to 277,000 by 1970, peaking at nearly 500,000 in 1976.  The strike wave was 
characterised by a sharp increase in the number of strikes — 145 stoppages in 1966, 313 in 1971 and 
562 in 1977 — and an increase in the average number of workers involved in each strike.  
Approximately 12 per cent of the entire New Zealand workforce took some form of industrial action 
in 1969-1970, and this figure was topped by the 19 per cent who took action in 1976, the highest 
levels of working class participation in strike activity for the entire twentieth century until this point 
(see Deeks et al., 1994, p. 374). 
 The union offensive led to strong gains in membership.  Union coverage rose to 55.6 per cent 
by 1975, as total private and public sector membership increased sharply from 450,000 to more than 
600,000 (Table 1).  Compositional trends that had been gathering pace in the union movement over 
the post-war decades now accelerated, with the result that public-sector unionism increased by more 
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than 50 per cent, alongside rapid growth in the manufacturing and distribution industries (Roth, 1973, 
p.162) (Table 1).  At the same time, the traditional strongholds of militant unionism, the railway 
workers, the seamen and the mineworkers, were losing ground as their industries were restructured 
and further mechanised. 
 Government and employers undertook a variety of sometimes quite contradictory steps to 
push back the working-class offensive.  The general position of the Employers’ Federation was for a 
continuation of the policies that had served them well in previous years — centralised wage 
bargaining and the continuation of compulsory unionism (Roper, 1990b).  However, this became 
increasingly untenable.  The election of the Muldoon Government in 1975 and his attempted 
imposition of an austerity drive and a twelve month wages freeze did not halt the industrial push but 
rather inspired a wave of protest action, resulting in a tactical government retreat on the wage freeze in 
1976-1977. 
 The failure of Muldoon's wages freeze led to a crisis of confidence within employer ranks by 
the late 1970s.  Statutory wage controls of the type experimented with throughout the decade had 
either failed to rein in industrial action or had been actively broken by the unions.  Nor had collective 
bargaining worked — indeed, it had generated wages breakouts of an uncontrolled nature.  The failure 
of Muldoon's interventionist style of government, most particularly his second attempt at a wages 
freeze in 1982-1984, led to employer desertion of the National cause and a turn to Labour and the 
politics of Rogernomics. 
 
The Ruling-Class Counter-Offensive, 1984-1995 
 
(i) Overview 
 
The factors behind, and the content of, the ruling-class offensive against New Zealand's working class 
under the stewardship of the fourth Labour Government have been described extensively elsewhere 
(Roper, 1993a).  Of most importance for this chapter is the fact that at the heart of the neo-liberal 
market-driven orthodoxy of the fourth Labour Government lay the notion that high levels of welfare 
benefits and strong trade unions were to blame for the problems faced by New Zealand capitalism, a 
belief also held firmly within the ranks of the successor fourth National Government. 
 Under both the fourth Labour and National Governments, organised labour was dealt several 
damaging blows.  The emergence of mass unemployment, deregulation, and the impact of competition 
all hit the traditional bastions of militant unionism hard.  In the core areas of mining and transport, 
Labour Government policy hastened a process that had been underway for some years.  The 
meatworkers union, the major surviving base of militant blue-collar unionism, was devastated during 
the 1970s and 1980s by mechanisation, the export of live sheep, and a deliberate strategy by the major 
companies to move away from large works in the major metropolises to smaller satellite works in 
small towns and country areas.  Likewise, public-sector unionism was hard hit under the impact of 
Labour's State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 which facilitated the corporatisation and sell-off of all 
major state-owned commercial operations.   
 The result was a decline of union membership for the first time since the Depression of the 
1930s.  After peaking in 1981 at 520,000, registered (private-sector) membership declined thereafter, 
while state sector union membership peaked in 1985 at nearly 193,000 and then fell precipitously by 
1989 to 162,000 (see Table 1). 
 The ruling class offensive against unionism was met first by a slow recovery in industrial 
action in the early 1980s, a sharp explosion in 1985-1986, and then a collapse which developed into a 
rout by the early 1990s (Table 1).  The increase in the strike rate in the early to mid-1980s in New 
Zealand runs counter to the trend in most other western nations at this time, but despite the impressive 
burst of activity, the underlying characteristic was one of retreat (Roper, 1990b).  There was a steady 
decline in the number of industrial disputes, falling back from 562 in 1977 to 291 in 1981, and 215 in 
1986.  The wave of industrial conflict in 1985-1986 evident in Table 1 was due not to an outbreak of 
aggressive strikes in a wide variety of workplaces and industries, a feature of the 1960s, the number of 
workers involved in the 1986 strike peak was actually one half that of 1976, but to an employer 
offensive.  Disputes over redundancy payments became common and in some sectors lockouts became 
significant.  The bitterness of these disputes is indicated from the lengthening of the average dispute, 
from a typical two to three days in the previous years, to thirteen days in 1986.  
 The retreat of the labour movement and a pressing need to drive productivity up and costs 
down faster than hitherto led to a shift of sentiment within employer ranks towards a deregulationist 
agenda.  Key elements of the new agenda were voluntary unionism, enterprise bargaining, pay 
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increases to be based on company ‘capacity to pay’ rather than on relativities or the cost of living, the 
removal of ‘restrictive work practices’, the introduction of youth rates, the elimination of national 
awards, the introduction of anti-strike legislation and the reduction of non-wage costs of employment 
(such as sick pay, maternity leave and accident compensation levies) (The Employer April, 1986, pp. 
1–4). 
 Legislation introduced by Labour and then the National Government realised many of these 
goals.  The Labour Relations Act 1987 was the first significant step in undermining the framework of 
national awards.  While restoring compulsory unionism, it also prohibited unions from seeking access 
to enterprise bargaining (second-tier agreements) while still maintaining award coverage for the 
affected workers.  Although relatively few unions deserted the award system (Harbridge and McCaw, 
1991), this provision clearly encouraged a process of union and award fragmentation as stronger 
groups of workers were encouraged to opt out of awards, leaving their defence in the hands of weaker 
unions and non-union workers.  The fourth Labour Government thereby paved the way for the 
ultimate abolition of awards by its successor.  The State Sector Act 1988 further undermined unions 
by scrapping job tenure in the public sector and reducing other long-established conditions of 
employment. 
 The Employment Contracts Act (ECA) 1991 represented the complete enactment of the 
agenda of the New Zealand Business Roundtable with devastating results for organised labour.  
Organising on the job was made immensely more difficult as employers now had the right to refuse to 
negotiate with an employee's chosen bargaining agent, to use lockouts to force concessions, and to 
replace striking workers with blacklegs (Douglas, 1993a).  Union membership fell sharply as a result, 
from 600,000 to 375,000 between May 1991, when the Act took effect, and December 1994.  Union 
coverage therefore fell back — from 41 per cent of the workforce to 23 per cent (The Independent, 14 
July, 1995, pp. 34–5) (see Table 1).1    Entire unions, such as the Clerical Workers Union, collapsed, 
while membership fell by 50-75 per cent in the agriculture, construction and wholesale and retail 
industries in the Act's first three years.  Union decline has been most evident in the private sector, with 
state sector membership declining by ‘only’ 13 per cent, one-half the rate of decline across the labour 
movement at large (Harbridge et al., 1995).  
 
(ii) Reaction within the Labour Movement 
 
The ruling class offensive of the 1980s and 1990s met with two responses within the union movement, 
organisational restructuring and, much more significantly, a new political strategy.   
 
Organisational Restructuring 
At the peak level, the decline of the blue-collar and the rise of white collar unionism through the 
1970s and 1980s eventually led to pressure for unity between the Federation of Labour, comprising 
private-sector workers, and the Combined State Sector Unions, with an exclusively public-sector 
membership.  The result, the Council of Trade Unions with 530,000 affiliated members, was formed 
in 1987, on the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the FOL, and took over responsibility for 
developing general union policies and providing overall leadership to the labour movement.  The CTU 
picked up some unions which had not been members of either federation but also lost some of those 
which had been members of the FOL in the past, chiefly in the transport and maritime unions but also 
electricians and timber workers.  
 The CTU and the fourth Labour Government were keen proponents of union amalgamation, 
the former proposing in its key 1988 document Strategies for Change that the union movement be 
restructured around fourteen key industry unions (Council of Trade Unions, 1989).  As a result of the 
provision in the Labour Relations Act 1987 requiring unions to have at least 1,000 members, the 
number of unions halved from 223 to 112 between 1986 and 1989.  The ECA, by strangling union 
finances, further encouraged this trend, and the number of unions slipped by the end of 1994 to 
eighty-two.  Only ten unions had more than 10,000 members by this time, but these ten covered 70 per 
cent of total union membership.  
 A further organisational trend has been the evident attempt by some unions to shift their focus 
away from the centralised structures typical of the arbitrationist days to a decentralised structure 
capable of dealing with the requirements of local bargaining and contract negotiations.  With the shift 
of wage determination away from arbitration or multi-employer industry bargaining to enterprise level 
bargaining in the 1970s and 1980s, the lack of workplace structures in some unions had become a 
liability, and the ECA simply further highlighted this fact.  According to Peetz et al., 
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This change in bargaining level has required a far greater degree of participation 
and responsibility by branch officials and workplace delegates than had previously 
been the case.  It has required a much greater emphasis on direct bargaining with 
individual employers and a closer, more responsive relationship between union 
officials and their membership ... In many instances the function of bargaining has 
had to pass from paid officials to local delegates (1993, p. 268).  
 
However, as will be seen, this drive towards ‘closer, more responsive relationships’ between officials 
and members is limited by the overall political agenda of the CTU. 
 
The Adoption of Strategic Unionism 
A key feature of CTU strategy in the final years of the fourth Labour Government was its adoption of 
the ‘strategic unionism’ model first pursued by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
across the Tasman.  The ACTU had been in close partnership with the Australian Labour Government 
since the signing of the Accord in 1983.  The Accord philosophy embodied what became known by 
the late 1980s as strategic unionism, which involved a commitment by unions to forsake workplace 
industrial action in return for access to political power in the national capital.  The purpose of the 
latter was to lobby government to improve working-class living standards through job creation and 
expanded welfare, superannuation, and pensions.  A critical argument behind strategic unionism was 
that unions had to move away from arguing over the distribution of the proceeds of production to 
intervening in the process of production itself and, at the national level, in economic policy processes 
which were the ultimate determinant of employment opportunities for union members.  This required 
that unions took responsibility for increasing productivity and cutting wage costs. 
 Consequently, Australian unions agreed in the 1980s to cooperate in massive industrial 
restructuring of core industries, in return for their involvement in consultation with employers and 
government representatives over the shape of industrial relations, industry and economic policy.  
Australian union strategy was developed along these lines in the seminal document Australia 
Reconstructed in 1987 which paved the way for the transition away from an award system to 
enterprise bargaining.  
 Key to the implementation of ACTU strategy was reciprocity, that is, agreement by the 
Australian government and major employers to incorporate union leaders in the policy process rather 
than to exclude them.  In terms of many of its original goals as regards living standards and social 
equity, the Accord failed the interests of Australian unionists, but in terms of the process it was a 
partial success — there was extensive consultation by the government with the peak union body, and 
union-busting was an exception as an employer strategy, rather than the rule.  This laid the basis for 
the outstanding longevity of the Accord process throughout the period of the Hawke and Keating 
Labour Governments. 
 In New Zealand, the CTU sought to pursue a similar strategy.  It promoted what it called a 
‘third way’ between the rival capitalist strategies of unbridled free markets and Muldoonite 
centralism, ‘shifting bargaining away from occupation and towards enterprise and industry, changing 
work methods, negotiating around improvements to productivity, and recognising the need for 
modern, internationally competitive production systems’ (Council of Trade Unions, 1991, p. 23).  The 
Engineers Union went furthest in attempting to implement such a strategy and sold itself to employers 
as being ‘responsible’ and amenable to major changes in established working methods and reductions 
to conditions of employment.  
 Unlike the ACTU, however, the CTU had much less success in pursuing a corporatist strategy 
.  Influenced by the Business Roundtable and Treasury, the fourth Labour Government refused to 
consult with the union leadership in any significant economic policy decisions (Bray and Walsh, 
1995).  In effect, the CTU leadership had nothing to sell which the government and employers did not 
feel they could take by virtue of the industrial climate and their perception of the CTU’s inability to 
discipline its affiliates.  
 The failure of CTU strategy was best illustrated by the debacle over a proposed Compact with 
the Government, a document which provided for union endorsement of wage restraint in return for a 
commitment by the government to involve the CTU more closely in developing its macroeconomic 
policies (Council of Trade Unions, 1988a).  The CTU leadership kept discussions within a tight-knit 
group of senior officials and politicians and expended extensive resources on promoting the case for 
the Compact within the wider union movement.  All of its endeavours were in vain, however, as the 
Compact was ultimately scuppered by government and employer indifference, and its successor, the 
Agreement for Growth, signed in April 1990, was a much more limited document, representing 
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merely the preparedness by the CTU leadership to accept further wage cuts under a re-elected Labour 
Government in return for a vague commitment by the Government to involve the CTU in economic 
planning.  The defeat of Labour in 1990 ensured that this Agreement was never tested. 
 At the same time as the CTU was facing continued rebuffs by the Labour Government, 
working-class dissatisfaction with the government was growing.  Dannin  has pointed to the crux of 
the CTU's problem. 
 
The CTU's formal and institutional alliance with Labour left it unable to criticise 
Labour when it privatised government agencies and deregulated industries.  In turn, 
by failing to keep faith with its membership and by failing to promote their 
interests within their party, the CTU became estranged from its membership and 
allies and thus weakened.  A large number of the public looked to the CTU for 
leadership and heard nothing (1995, p. 39). 
 
The exclusion of the CTU from decision-making processes in Wellington was replicated at workplace 
level by an anti-union offensive by employers.  Although some formal recognition was given by a 
small number of employers to union involvement in workplace reform initiatives, such employers 
were clearly in the minority.  Only the Engineers Union appears to have sustained continuing 
relationships with a minority of large employers such as Fisher and Paykel.  However, the assistance 
offered by the union at such workplaces is such as to call into question the continuing independence of 
the union itself.  Furthermore, the urgency of restructuring meant that even these efforts were easily 
over-ridden.  The Fortex meatworks in Dunedin, for example, was a model of workplace reform but 
was closed down by its owners as a cost-cutting measure in the early 1990s. 
 
(iii) The Battle over the ECA 
The failure of New Zealand's labour leaders to defend working-class living standards and even the 
basis of unionism itself was most evident in its strategy in the battle over the Employment Contracts 
bill in the period between its tabling in late 1990 to its enactment in May 1991.  At the time of its 
enactment, the bill was widely opposed and the National Government itself was extremely unpopular 
after only six months in office.  The key task for the CTU was that of mobilising opposition to the bill 
in a public and politically-damaging fashion to the government.  Central to this was the organisation 
of a general strike amongst all unionists.  Such action was a step that could have forced the 
government to back down and, perhaps paradoxically, the only form that would attract solid support 
from the largest number of workers.  That a general strike would have hurt National's business backers 
is evident.  But economic uncertainty and an aggressive employer mentality meant that any strategy 
based on partial actions, involving only small groups of workers, was bound to fail as workers stayed 
at work fearing victimisation.  
 The willingness of the majority of workers to participate in a general strike is clear from 
events as they unfolded in the first four months of 1991.  Public servants, engineers, teachers, nurses 
and health workers, seafarers, harbour workers, steelworkers, railway workers, shop assistants, 
cleaners, caretakers and security guards all took action, ranging from stop-works to strikes against the 
bill.  Marches and rallies took place in the capital and all major regional centres.  It has been estimated 
that participation in such action involved between 300,000 and 500,000 New Zealanders, with 50,000 
working days lost in strike action in the first week of April 1991 (Dannin, 1995, p. 83).  According to 
Roper there was not ‘a single instance amongst the major unions of workers failing to endorse, and by 
very large majorities, strike action where they were balloted’ (1995, p. 270). 
 The missing element in the whole campaign was leadership as workers did not have the 
confidence or the networks to organise a general strike from below.  Central co-ordination by the 
established union leadership was needed but the CTU leadership failed in this task.  The CTU strategy 
was effectively limited to organising a massive publicity campaign, highlighting the drawbacks of the 
bill.  This was certainly effective in raising awareness of its dangers, but what action workers were to 
take in response was left completely unspecified (Dannin, 1995, pp. 76-81).  Enamoured of strategic 
unionism and convinced of a need to move away from ‘old-fashioned’ forms of union action (most 
notably strikes), the leadership of the CTU actively sought to demoralise those pressing for a general 
strike, and at a Special Affiliates Conference in April 1991, the majority of union officials present 
voted against a national general strike, preferring to endorse a strategy of organising a public petition 
to protest at government actions and mounting regional campaigns with each region deciding for itself 
the appropriate action.  Faced by the most aggressive onslaught by capital and the state for a full 
century, the CTU leadership continued to believe that it was facing merely a minor upset in a basically 
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harmonious relationship.  The failure of the CTU leadership to lead led to a collapse of morale within 
the union ranks.  While other groups sought to fill the vacuum caused by the desertion of the CTU 
from the field of battle, they were too small, lacked industrial clout or, in some cases, were 
consciously marginalised by the CTU leadership, leaving the way clear for the bill's progress into law 
(Dannin, 1995, pp. 74–8). 
 The failure of the CTU's political strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s had an impact on 
the organisational structure of the union movement.  In 1993, a left-wing rival peak federation, the 
Trade Union Federation (TUF), centred on the Manufacturing and Construction Workers Union, was 
formed as a result of dissatisfaction with the CTU and its failure to resist attacks by the National 
Government.  By 1995, however, the TUF had made little ground in attracting individual unions to its 
ranks, with twelve affiliated unions and coverage of 23,000 workers in comparison to the CTU which 
remained the dominant union federation with twenty-seven member unions and 300,000 members.  
Outside both federations were forty-three non-aligned unions with 56,000 members. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The experience of New Zealand unions since 1945 lends support to the notion that trade union 
officials represent a conservative layer within the union movement.  Indeed, a recurring theme of New 
Zealand's union history is one of former militant union leaders first being tamed by, and then 
becoming active supporters of, the industrial and political establishment.  During the 1930s and 1940s, 
figures such as Bob Semple, Tim Armstrong, Paddy Webb, Jim Roberts, Angus McLagan, Ken Baxter 
and Fintan Patrick Walsh, who were in the first wave of  industrial militants, all rejected their pasts 
and became committed to wartime mobilisation, work intensification and the drastic curtailment of 
union rights and living standards in their capacities as Ministers of Labour or leading figures in the 
FOL.  Many even pressed for the continuation of restrictions after war's end.  In New Zealand's Red 
Purge of 1946-1952, these former militants actively campaigned for the smashing of renegade unions, 
such as the carpenters and waterside workers.  In more recent times Tom Skinner, FOL president in 
the 1960s and 1970s, was knighted for his services, and Ken Douglas, formerly militant unionist in the 
Wellington drivers union, has sought solace in the CTU's utopian ‘third way’. 
 The understanding by New Zealand employers and governments that such union leaders could 
be trusted lay behind their decision to incorporate them into the management of industrial relations 
matters.  The post-war settlement was shattered, however, by the working-class offensive of the late 
1960s.  A sea-change in employer opinion forged in adverse economic circumstances of the 1970s and 
1980s then led to the final destruction of the post-war settlement with the decision to marginalise and 
then dismantle the entire apparatus of unionism in the latter period.  The failure of New Zealand's 
union leaders to fend off the ruling class offensive means that the bitterness widely prevalent amongst 
workers both union and non-union, concerning the effects of the decade-long New Right offensive, 
finds no outlets.  The demoralisation and pessimism abroad amongst union leaders, obsessed by their 
chase for ‘a quality economy in a quality society’ (Council of Trade Unions, 1993, p. 3), prevents 
them from campaigning for a fair share of the benefits of the recovery for members, less still from 
mounting a major assault on the government. 
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                Table 7.1 
Year Private Sector  Public Sector Total Trade  Trade Union Working days
   Trade Unions   Trade Unions   Union    Density   lost 
      Membership  
1945 229103 53345 282448 59.63 66629
1946 247498  30393
1947 260739  102725
1948 271100  93464
1949 275977  218172
1950 275779 58713 334492 56.95 271475
1951 272957  1157390
1952 283496  28123
1953 290149  19291
1954 299254  20474
1955 304520 69186 373463 56.51 52043
1956 307031  23870
1957 317137  28186
1958 324438  18788
1959 327495  29651
1960 332362 82191 414553 54.71 35683
1961 324747  38185
1962 332801  93157
1963 334128  54490
1964 346857  66834
1965 353105 95132 448237 50.94 21814
1966 362760  99095
1967 366884  139490
1968 364872  130267
1969 366523  138675
1970 378465 115019 493484 50.63 277348
1971 386275  162563
1972 394748  140672
1973 427692  271706
1974 436623  183688
1975 454991 150000 604991 55.64 214632
1976 464453 160000 624453 488441
1977 473432  436808
1978 486533  380605
1979 506963  381896
1980 516297  373496
1981 519705  388086
1982 527797  330028
1983 527545  371774
1984 485484  424921
1985 490206 192800 683006 43.5 756432
1986 489763  1329054
1987   366300
1988   381700
1989 486483 162342 649875 44.7 193300
1990   610265 330900
1991   603118 41.5 99032
1992   428160 28.8 113742
1993   409112 26.8 23770
13 
1994   375906 23.4 38300
1995   362200 21.7 53352
    
    
Sources: Roth (1973 and 1978); Brosnan et al. (1990); Harbridge and Hince (1992); 
and Crawford, Harbridge and Hince (1996).  
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Other literature on this topic 
 
Literature on the theory and practice of trade unionism in Western democracies has a history 
as long as that of trade unionism itself. One of the best recent summaries is provided by Kelly 
(1988). Most industrial relations textbooks summarise the unitarist/ pluralist/ radical typology, 
but for the original exposition, see Fox (1973). The unitarist perspective has been well-
represented in New Zealand in recent years by publications from the Business Roundtable and 
the Employers Federation. See for example, the NZ Employers Federation 1990 charter (The 
Benefits of Bargaining Reform) and publications by Business Council lawyer Penelope Brook 
(1989; 1990). These arguments are echoed in a "pop" version by writers such as Coddington 
(1993). Ellen Dannin has exposed the flimsy basis of these works in a series of publications - 
see, for example, Dannin (1992 & 1996). 
 
The classic literature on trade union officials is summarised in Hyman's short 1971 pamphlet 
and more recently in Kelly (1988). The notion that union officials constitute a conservative 
force in the labour movement has been challenged by the later Hyman (1979), Zeitlin (1989a; 
1989b), and Heery and Kelly (1994). Their arguments have been critically evaluated in 
Bramble (1993). 
 
There is also a rich literature on New Zealand unionism. Olssen and Richardson (1986) and 
Olssen (1986a) have summarised some of the main historical landmarks between 1880 and 
1940, while Roth (1974 & 1978) authored some of the key texts in the area. Roth (1974: 64-
83) and Sinclair (1976, Chapters 21 & 22) also furnish brief but useful accounts of the effect 
of the Cold War inside the New Zealand labour movement. 
 
Roper (1990) and Boston (1984) have summarised union strategies from the late 1960s to the 
early 1980s, while Bray and Walsh (1992 & 1995) have traced the relative success of the 
strategies of the Australian and NZ union movements in the 1980s. Australian literature on the 
ALP-ACTU Accord is extensive and includes Singleton (1990) and Ewer et al (1991). The 
shift to strategic unionism within leading circles of the NZ union movement evident in two 
key CTU documents, The Need for Change (1988) and Strategies for Change (1989), can be 
tracked in Campbell and Kirk (1983), Harris (1988), and Harvey (1988). Policy documents 
from and presidential addresses to successive CTU conferences also provide a record of the 
CTU's own assessment of its strategy (see CTU, 1991; 1993; Douglas, 1991; 1993).  
 
The best critical account of CTU strategy between 1987 and 1994 is provided by Dannin 
(1995), who also provides accounts of the extent and prevalence of workers' resistance to the 
Employment Contracts Bill in early 1991, as does Heal (1994). People's Voice has been a 
sustained critic of CTU strategy since the peak body's formation, most particularly at the time 
of the Compact and in the battle against the ECA. 
 
See Plowman and Street (1993), Roper (1993), Kelsey (1995) and Murray (1996) for studies 
of the power of the Business Roundtable. For employer analyses of the fourth Labour 
Government's industrial relations legislation, see Business Roundtable (1986) and NZEF 
(1987). For academic accounts of this legislation, see Walsh (1989), Dannin (1992), and 
Deeks et al (1994). 
 
Douglas (1993) and Dannin (1995b) have provided useful analyses of some of the problems 
facing unions under the ECA, while Anderson (in press) has tracked the effect of recent 
Employment Court decisions. 
 
The policies of traditional employer body, the NZ Employers Federation, towards New 
Zealand's unions are recorded in its magazine The Employer. 
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1  Harbridge et al. (1995) provide another estimate of union density in this period (65 per cent and 43 per cent in 
May 1991 and December 1994 respectively) but the method for calculation of these figures is not consistent 
with earlier density figures. 
